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BEYOND INVENTION: PATENT AS KNOWLEDGE LAW
by
Michael J. Madison∗
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Bilski v.
Kappos, concerning the legal standard for determining patentable
subject matter under the American Patent Act, is used in this Essay as a
starting point for a brief review of historical, philosophical, and cultural
influences on subject matter questions in both patent and copyright law.
The Essay suggests that patent and copyright law jurisprudence was
constructed initially by the Court with explicit attention to the
relationship between these forms of intellectual property law and the roles
of knowledge in society. Over time, explicit attention to that relationship
has largely disappeared from the Court’s opinions. The Essay suggests
that renewing consideration of the idea of a law of knowledge would
bring some clarity not only to patentable subject matter questions in
particular but also to much of intellectual property law in general.
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INTRODUCTION

The contemporary struggle to define what modern courts, scholars,
and lawyers call “patentable subject matter” builds on centuries’ worth of
∗
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politics, culture, philosophy, technology, and legal practice. It is hardly
surprising that any given decision on the topic by the Supreme Court of
1
the United States—in the current instance, Bilski v. Kappos, decided in
2010—should have a decidedly modest ambition and impact. Bilski itself
likely will be little remembered; none of the opinions in the case
advances the state of the law significantly. What Bilski does signify is that
modern anxiety about the proper scope of patent law, and about
intellectual property generally, has reached a critical point, one where
the Supreme Court’s intellectual property jurisprudence has so painted
the Court into a doctrinal corner that escape is virtually impossible—
except by radically rethinking the problem.
There was a time, decades ago, when intellectual property scholars
confronted the then-novel technology of computer programming and
wondered aloud whether some new legal paradigm was needed, beyond
copyright and patent, to accommodate and balance the interests of
2
producers, customers and consumers, re-users, and the public at large.
That time passed. No such paradigm emerged. The problem—dealing
with multiple forms of intellectual property law and policy for what
appear to be the same subject matter, or no relevant form of intellectual
property law for that subject matter—has deepened. Today, a related but
different moment has arrived. The occasion, marked by Bilski, is not a
new technology but the very absence of technology; it is the idea that
patterns of living might be constructed in law and practice not merely as
3
“algorithm[s],” to borrow a term from an older Supreme Court opinion,
but as man-made, virtual yet patentable machines. The modernist
architect Le Corbusier wrote, “The house is a machine for living in”
4
(machine à habiter). Decades later, living has itself become a kind of
machine. That is both the premise and the implication of the plausible
but terribly odd question framed by contemporary patentable subject
matter cases: When is a patent available for behaving in a certain way?
For causing others to behave in a certain way? For causing what can be
fairly called “nature” to behave in a certain way? May a person obtain a
patent on a way of organizing the activities of the staff of a restaurant
kitchen? Strategizing risks in a market? Modifying the frequency,
amplitude, or duration of an electric current, or signal?
If there are answers to these questions, they may be legal epicycles,
finely tuned fixes to the workings of a Ptolemaic system whose basic
1

130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
See, e.g., Allen Newell, Response, The Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken!,
47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023, 1034–35 (1986); Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell
D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2310 (1994).
3
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (ruling that a mathematical
“algorithm” represented in a computer program did not constitute a patentable
process).
4
LE CORBUSIER, TOWARD AN ARCHITECTURE 151 (John Goodman trans., 2007)
(1923).
2
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premises are in doubt. Those answers can be found in patent doctrine
only using the limited internal tools of patent law itself. Propositions that
are “abstract” and things that are not “articles of manufacture” may not
5
6
be patented. Bilski defines a patentable “process” as a “process” or,
according to one concurrence, as an “art,” which is defined in part as a
7
“process.” In no sense should any of this be regarded as progress,
Constitutional or otherwise.
There is a conceptual problem to be investigated before the
doctrinal problem can be solved, and the conceptual problem lies in the
near-total isolation of contemporary patent doctrine from copyright and
8
trademark law, despite the shared roots of all three. Working toward a
solution therefore requires returning to the foundations of patent law
and to themes that blended what we now think of and apply as distinct
bodies of law in a combined (though not perfectly integrated)
jurisprudence. In that project, I focus here on ideas of knowledge that
were fundamental to early thinking about what became intellectual
property doctrine and that should remain so. I do not suggest that Bilski
(or any other single case or policy development) counsels abolishing
9
patent law and starting over from first principles. I do suggest that patent
law could be strengthened by revisiting and building on its conceptual
and pragmatic linkages with other intellectual property traditions, all of
which focused, in the first place, on forms and practices of knowledge.
Those other intellectual property traditions could be strengthened as
well.
I organize the rest of this Essay as follows. Part II very briefly sets out
key themes represented in the intellectual, cultural, and political
histories which yielded what is generally regarded as the first modern
10
patent law, the English Statute of Monopolies of 1624 and which
followed that statute, leading up to and shortly beyond what is generally
11
regarded as the first modern copyright law, the Statute of Anne of 1710.
Part III traces those themes through major milestones in the
development of subject matter jurisprudence for all of American

5

See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226–27.
Id. at 3225–26 (linking the word “process” in section 101 of the Patent Act to
the definition of “process” in section 100(b) of the Patent Act).
7
Id. at 3247 (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that patents were historically
confined to “arts,” for which the statutory term “process” is a synonym).
8
Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984)
(noting the “historic kinship” between copyright and patent law but not exploring
the sources or broader implications of that relationship).
9
I do not adopt either the method or the conclusion of Justice Stevens’s
concurrence in Bilski, in which four Justices argued that the statutory term “process”
can only mean what the non-legal term “art” and the Constitutional phrase “useful
Arts” meant when the Constitution granted Congress the power to enact patent law.
See Bilski, 103 S. Ct. at 3247, 3252 (Stevens, J., concurring).
10
See Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
11
See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
6
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intellectual property law, in an effort to reintroduce some conceptual
integration to a field that has become increasingly fragmented. Those
milestones are primarily Supreme Court opinions, though it is necessarily
and obviously true that the Court has always engaged in an interpretive
dialogue with Congress. Part IV brings that survey to a close with a rereading of the Bilski case itself. Part V suggests a different way forward,
arguing that the time is right to suspend the search for bright line
distinctions among patent, copyright, and trademark law based on their
respective subject matter and instead to consider overlaps and
differentiation based on social interests in knowledge.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF KNOWLEDGE LAW
It is conventional today to think of patent law as dealing in
12
knowledge, but current usage is misleading. Patents are understood as
dealing in technical knowledge, or information about how the material
world works and how that information might be applied to solve material
problems. That sort of knowledge is self-evidently only one form of
knowledge, and in historical terms it might not even be considered a
13
particularly important—one might say, virtuous—form of knowledge.
What I have in mind with the term knowledge, here and below, are the
many ways in which we know the world around us: ways of seeing and
understanding, which are necessary to the constitution of state,
community, and individual citizens within it. By this definition, the arts—
including literature, music, sculpture, and film—are forms of knowledge,
though in many respects art is quite unlike science as a form of
knowledge. It might be better argued that performing arts, visual arts,
musical arts, and literary arts—to use one rough taxonomy—are distinct
forms of knowledge, as are physics, biology, and chemistry and their
engineering counterparts—to use an equally rough cousin. But these

12
See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine
Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379, 1384 (2010) (“The disclosure obligations [of the Patent
Act] require a patent applicant to publicize information in a strong sense—to give
the public a use privilege in the invention qua knowledge, free of the strings of
property.”).
13
Aristotle prioritized knowing (the universal) over making (the specific object)
as forms of knowledge, and making over practice, or the exercise of judgment. But all
forms of knowledge—theoria, poiesis, and praxis—were intertwined as an
understanding of knowledge as virtue. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk.
VI (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
The ancient authority of poets and philosophers and the relatively low status of
the craftsman may be contrasted with an anecdotal sociology of intellectual property
law practice that puts patent lawyers at the top of an informal hierarchy, based on the
technical training required for a person to obtain the right to practice before the
United States Patent Office. Knowledge of science, in its modern sense, has been a
reliable path to authority and prestige. According to stereotypes, copyright lawyers
know art, music, and literature and occupy a middle ground; trademark lawyers know
advertising and marketing.
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different levels of abstraction are not mutually exclusive. It is plausible to
see modern “science” as a form of knowledge at the same time as one
sees “physics” as another form, any subfield of physics as a third, and so
on.
That short, highly abstracted review expresses concerns that are
typically quite far from contemporary intellectual property practice, yet
that were front and center in the seventeenth and early eighteenth
century debates that set the law on its course toward the intellectual
property doctrines that we see and use today. In this Part, I briefly
recover three key themes from those debates in an effort to close some of
that distance: arts and artisanship as distinct technical and philosophical
frameworks for the production of knowledge; state and society as distinct
political frameworks for knowledge production; and elite and vernacular
interests as distinct social and cultural frameworks for knowledge
production. In each case, the distinction is dynamic rather than static,
and the lines between what I characterize as technical and philosophical,
political, and social and cultural frameworks are blurry. What we call
knowledge itself is in large part a product of these themes, rather than a
fixture within them. These are themes that operated centuries ago to
generate patent law—and copyright law, as a complement to patent, and
even some of trademark law—and themes that are represented, at times
too faintly, in modern intellectual property law.
A. Artistic and Artisanal Knowledge
Contemporary scholarship on the origins of intellectual property law
often works backward from the concept of the “useful Arts,” which
appears in the United States Constitution as the context in which
14
“[i]nventors” may be granted exclusive rights, that is, patents. “Useful
arts,” traceable to the mechanical arts of the seventeenth century, are
distinguished from “liberal arts,” the skills appropriate to citizenship in a
15
free republic. Products and materials relating to the useful arts were
and are thought suitable for patenting; they involve the development of
16
new things from existing universal truths or knowledge. Products and
materials relating to the liberal arts were and are thought suitable for
17
copyright; they involve knowledge itself. This view borrows from preindustrial practice and before, including Aristotle’s distinctions among
theory, things, and practice, carried through Rome, the Renaissance, and
into the Scientific Revolution.
That divide between “useful” and “liberal” arts was closing, however,
even as the Constitution was being drafted. The divide began to dissipate
14

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139,
1166–69, 1173–75 (1999).
16
See id. at 1143–44.
17
See id. at 1145.
15
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in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries during the birth of modern
science, as natural philosophers—the predecessors of modern
scientists—showed that nature itself, as well as scholarship, could be a
source of knowledge—theoretical knowledge. In the end, for both legal
and cultural purposes, scholars and scientists alike became “creators”—
18
those who create the immaterial and material “new” —and the idea of
“new” knowledge emerged too. In social terms, this narrative recounts a
progression from liberal arts as the domain of the scholarly elite, working
in discursive (text-based) media, toward natural philosophy and then
science, and a counterpart progression of mechanical arts as the domain
of the people, working in phenomenal (physical and practical) forms,
primarily objects, toward craft production. Practitioners of the former
became artists, a term that intentionally obscures its application to
“useful arts,” as creators of the new. The latter became artisans.
Knowledge workers, to borrow a modern phrase, started to work in the
lab as well as in the study and the monastery. Craft workers retreated to
the workshop.
Recent scholarship in the history of science complicates this
narrative, suggesting the existence of what Pamela Smith characterizes as
an “artisanal epistemology” that originated in workshops long prior to
the Scientific Revolution and that was incorporated into new scientific
19
practices rather than extinguished by them. That complication is
evoked by subtle ambiguities in patent law, which measures the
inventiveness of a new machine or process from the perspective of a
20
hypothetical construct sometimes referred to as the “skilled artisan” and
at other times as the “Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art,” or
21
PHOSITA. What can a mere artisan “know”? The idea of “artisanal
epistemology,” Smith explains, is that knowledge about the world may be
achieved through encounters with nature and particularly through bodily
22
encounters with nature, not only via scholarly engagement with text.
Bakers, painters, and locksmiths, artisans of their era, were medieval
knowledge workers, too.
The point is not only that medieval artisans implicitly (and at times
explicitly) developed a philosophy underlying their work to justify its
virtue, but also that artisanal virtue was directly traced forward to ideas
about knowledge. Smith describes and illuminates the path that ran
between medieval artisans and their forms of knowledge, on the one

18

See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE CREATORS: A HISTORY OF HEROES OF THE
IMAGINATION 524–27 (1992).
19
See PAMELA H. SMITH, THE BODY OF THE ARTISAN: ART AND EXPERIENCE IN THE
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 59–85 (2004).
20
E.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
21
See id. (treating the “skilled artisan” and the “person of ordinary skill in the art”
as synonyms). The term PHOSITA comes from the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(2006).
22
SMITH, supra note 19, at 59.

Do Not Delete

2011]

2/17/2011 6:47 PM

PATENT AS KNOWLEDGE LAW

77

hand, and natural philosophers and modern scientists, on the other. The
latter inherited from the former their hands-on knowledge of nature and
natural materials and the belief that knowledge of the world was rooted
23
in matter. Knowledge through practice, as artisanal epistemology, led to
and justified knowledge through experiment in the hands of natural
24
philosophers. Smith argues that this sequence occurred not only at the
level of rhetoric and argument, but in person, among painters, engravers,
physicians, alchemists, and early scientists—note the crossing of the
25
boundaries of social hierarchies—borrowing artisans’ active knowledge.
Given that background, it is hardly surprising—but should be
remembered, as Adrian Johns demonstrates in a recent book—that
English patent law, as the precursor to American patent law, emerged
more or less concurrently with the emergence of what we now know as
copyright law, and that both occurred against a background of emerging
understandings of the relationships among text, machine, and the
26
related ideas of identity and novelty. The epistemological challenge
posed by natural philosophy, given inherited Aristotelian traditions
(represented by the liberal arts as the highest forms of knowledge) and
the contrasting artisanal approach, was how to comprehend the related
but possibly distinct relationships between law and text, as the context for
27
copyright and literary property; and law and machine and matter, as
28
contexts for patent. Johns shows how what Smith termed “artisanal
epistemology” was deployed in the service of arguments by London’s
booksellers, who were trying to distinguish patent law from literary
property, and, in so doing, were trying to save a perpetual common law
29
right from preemption by statutory copyright. The arguments about
artisanal knowledge—knowledge that leads directly to modern patent law
sensibility—came to a head in the leading copyright case of Donaldson v.
30
Becket. One who copied a machine, it was argued, employed powers of
the mind, because the nature of manufacturing dictated artisanal
31
variation from one iteration of the machine to the next. One who
23

See id. at 92–93.
See id.
25
See id. at 59–60.
26
See ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG
TO GATES 140 (2009).
27
These being two different things, in the seventeenth century. See id. at 38–39.
28
See id. at 20–21.
29
See id. at 28–29.
30
(1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257, 257–58 (K.B.).
31
One machine was always slightly different than another, but a book offered a
different case. The material identity of a book was not the point; what mattered was
“identity” of the author’s intangible “[s]tyle and sentiment.” Tonson v. Collins,
(1761) 96 Eng. Rep. 180, 180, 189 (K.B.). Blackstone, arguing for the plaintiff in
Tonson v. Collins, put the case as follows: “Style and sentiment are the essentials of a
literary composition. These alone constitute its identity. The paper and print are
merely accidents, which serve as vehicles to convey that style and sentiment to a
distance. Every duplicate therefore of a work, whether ten or ten thousand, if it
24
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copied a book engaged in an act of mechanical reproduction. The
arguably “higher” nature of intellectual engagement in the former
justified treating patent as a form of limited statutory right, or privilege,
because of the importance to public welfare and social progress of
permitting acts of independent creation. That would preserve literary
property as a bulwark against mere piracy, as a right distinct from the
32
limits imposed by the Statute of Anne. The House of Lords rejected the
distinction—the booksellers’ commercial interest in the argument
cannot be discounted—but voted to treat copyright as a statutory grant,
33
equivalent to patent, rather than the reverse.
The judgment in Donaldson did not end the relevant history, either
legally or epistemologically, but the preceding brief summary highlights
several themes that still appear, sometimes in bits and pieces, in modern
intellectual property jurisprudence. First, in epistemological terms the
divide between text and object—so fundamental to modern intellectual
property law—was, and remains, more complex than is often
acknowledged. The fact that there was an epistemology of things
centuries ago is itself worth noting for its relevance to modern law, in
relation to the distinction between patent law and “nature,” the
distinction between patent law and copyright law, and the distinction
between the intangible inventions that comprise the subject matter of
patents, the intangible creations that comprise the subject matter of
copyright, and the tangible embodiments of both that are the subject
matter of chattel property law. History teaches that each of these
distinctions is, in a different way, a form of the pursuit of knowledge for
the common and individual good. Second, it is neither fair in historical
terms nor accurate in pragmatic terms to identify any one of these
epistemological distinctions as leading necessarily to the superiority of
one form of knowledge in relation to any other, that is, to identify some
subject as relevant to “intellectual” property or knowledge law and some
as not. Scientific and technical practice is recognized and rewarded in
intellectual property law today, we believe, because of the distinct ways in
which those forms of knowledge advance society’s interests. One might
characterize patents today as encouragement for “applied truth”—the
purest form of knowledge—without stretching the rhetoric of the law too
far. Smith’s work suggests how much more complicated that perspective
truly should be; Johns’s work suggests that the complexity is not limited
conveys the same style and sentiment, is the same identical work, which was produced
by the author’s invention and labour. But a duplicate of a mechanic engine is, at best,
but a resemblance of the other, and a resemblance can never be the same identical
thing. It must be composed of different materials, and will be more or less perfect in
the workmanship. Although therefore the inventor of a machine may not be injured
at common law, by the sale of a work made like his, it will not follow, that an author is
not injured by the surreptitious sale of a work that is absolutely and specifically his
own.” Id. See also JOHNS, supra note 26, at 134.
32
1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
33
Donaldson, 98 Eng. Rep. at 257–58.
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to patent law and in fact is inextricably linked with the origins of
copyright. Science, both in the modern sense of that term and in its
34
eighteenth century sense—universal knowledge —is bound up as much
with “artisanal” claims to truth (the work of the hand) as it is with
“intellectual claims to truth” (the work of the head). The classical divide
between what we now call arts and sciences was, at the onset of the
Scientific Revolution that appears to have reinforced that divide, crosscut by knowledge production across those categories and the social
classes that represented them.
B. Knowledge in State and Society
The epistemological histories of intellectual property disciplines
cannot be divorced from their political contexts, but the politics bear
independent consideration. The English Statute of Monopolies of 1624 is
generally regarded as the prototype for modern patent statutes. It barred
the Crown from granting “lettres Patentes” (letters patents) except in
extraordinary circumstances—the production or introduction to the state
35
of “new manufactures.” The standard account of this development
recites the Crown’s history of granting letters patents, better regarded as
privileges than exclusive or property rights, as tools of royal dispensation
and reward and the abuse of that power, leading to anti-monopoly
36
sentiment in Parliament and, eventually, to the Statute.
That account sometimes omits one or both of two key elements of
the political economy of the early seventeenth century. First, the conflict
over monopolies extended beyond manufactures, to printing (that is, to
books, among other things), which was subject to extensive independent
37
regulation within the commercial sphere. Second, the impact and
significance of the Statute, and the political and economic history that
followed over the next 150 years, culminating in Donaldson, had as much
to do with the distribution of power between what we would refer to as

34

See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125–26 (2002).
35
Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.). The limitation of stategranted monopolies to the production or introduction to the country of “new
manufactures” was subject to some important limitations, including patents or
privileges of unlimited duration on the production of ordnance and gunpowder, and
on printing, both of which could be continued—and were. Id.
36
See, e.g., Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents
Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 191–92 (2004)
(evaluating the development of early English patent law in institutional terms); Craig
Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia,
2 REV. L. & ECON. 223, 258 (2006) (describing the Statute of Monopolies as the
resolution of an interest-group conflict between the Crown and Parliament regarding
authority over monopolies).
37
The famous Case of Monopolies invalidated a royal monopoly on a printed
work: playing cards. Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), (1602) 77 Eng. Rep.
1260, 1260 (K.B.).
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the state (in historical context, the government) and civil and
commercial society (in context, the stationers who regulated the book
trade) as it did with the concept of exclusive rights for inventors and
inventions.
The production of printed texts in England in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries was regulated primarily by the Stationers’ Company,
a private association (or, one should say, the private association) of
38
London printers and booksellers. A member acquiring a manuscript
would record the “copy” in the register of the Company, assuring that
member’s exclusivity in the text as a matter of the Stationers’ regulation,
39
enforceable by the Stationers’ agents and in the Stationers’ court. The
Stationers Company was essentially a closed, private guild—if imperfect
in its enforcement practices—which purposefully and explicitly aligned
its interest in regulating fair commercial practices in the book trade with
40
the interests of social order and welfare. The claim was not an early
version of a modern utilitarian idea (what would be good for the
Stationers would be good for society); rather, the claim appears to have
been that the Stationers assumed a kind of trusteeship with respect to the
form and content of the knowledge that constituted the subject matter of
the public sphere. In science, the Royal Society bid to assume a
41
comparable position.
Printing patents, royal privileges guaranteeing exclusivity with
respect to a particular text, undertook in practice to regulate parts of the
book trade in ways that were analogous to, if not precisely identical to,
42
the authority assumed by the Stationers’ Company. Where subject
matter overlapped, printing privileges supervened the Company’s
interest, and the Company members also received privileges for certain
books or for classes of books. The production and distribution of a text
that was the subject of a printing privilege was regulated by the Crown,
rather than by the Company, creating what in effect was—given the
avowed purposes of the Stationers’ regime—a dual system of social
control. When Parliament moved to enact the Statute of Monopolies,
therefore, the question was not only the existence of monopolies,
particularly monopolies in books, but the source and purpose of
43
monopolies in books. The question was also printing patents. The effect
of the Statute of Monopolies, as it applied to the book trade, was not to
38
In that era, members would be described more as manufacturers of books than
as publishers (firms that contracted with authors and with printers) in a modern
sense, although over the course of the Stationers’ history, booksellers eventually drew
ahead of printers as matters of social hierarchy and economic influence.
39
See JOHNS, supra note 26, at 17–18, 25–26.
40
See id. at 25–30.
41
See id. at 69–70.
42
See id. at 28.
43
See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 16–17, 23–
24 (1993) (describing printing patents as “privileges” and suggesting that they should
be regarded more as forms of patronage than as forms of property).
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abolish monopolies altogether or even to abolish monopolies in books;
44
printing patents were left untouched by the Statute.
Rather, by permitting monopolies in books to continue while other
monopolies were strictly regulated, the Statute focused attention on the
respective roles of the Crown and the commercial community regarding
trade in books. Should the monopolies granted by the Stationers’
Company be insulated from state-sanctioned competition? Over the
succeeding century and a half, the struggle continued over the locus of
social control of printed knowledge. Should that remain with the state, or
should it shift to the commercial sphere? The state charter supporting
45
the Stationers’ authority lapsed in 1695, and the turbulence that
followed produced the first modern copyright statute, the Statute of
Anne. That statute vested the copy in a manuscript, in the first instance,
in the individual author of a book, rather than in the printer who
46
acquired the manuscript and registered the copy. But it took the
judgment in Donaldson in 1774, rejecting the co-existence of literary
property and copyright in the same material, to give the statute its social
and economic bite. As some of this dust began to settle in the early
eighteenth century, the case for literary property as a natural right had
been rejected, and copyrights and patents had been put on equivalent
legal footing as state-enforced property rights. The Stationers’ role as
guardian of commerce in knowledge, founded on the premise of literary
property and non-interference by the state, had been undone. A new
class of publishers started to grow up, succeeding to the booksellers’
status based on their access to the knowledge creators: authors. The
artisans on whose printing skill the Stationers had built their enterprise
receded to craft status.
That shift is easy enough for a modern reader to comprehend in
economic terms, but I focus on its political and institutional implications.
The question was allocation of authority for determining whether a
particular monopoly in knowledge would serve the public interest. Under
what circumstances should competition be accepted or encouraged and
under what circumstances should it be condemned as a piracy, inimical
to public order? Would these determinations be functions of the state or
civil society? What form would that authority take in either case? By what
standards would claims of new knowledge, authoritative knowledge,
authentic knowledge, or harmful knowledge be established by the state?
By what standards would these things be established by private interests,
as agents of commerce and society?
None of these questions is entirely absent from contemporary
debates, but contemporary versions rarely are set in the historical context

44
45
46

See id. at 46.
See JOHNS, supra note 26, at 111.
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
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47

outlined here. Historians have discussed the meaning of the Statute of
Monopolies in the context of contests for control between Parliament
48
and the King, anticipating the Glorious Revolution and the Restoration.
The better uses of history here involve appreciating the tidal features of
the struggle for control of knowledge between the state, on the one
hand, and society, represented by the commercial interests of the
Stationers’ Company, on the other, that began around the time of the
Statute of Monopolies at the beginning of the seventeenth century and
that continued in England for nearly 200 years. The Statute of
Monopolies drew a line between material knowledge and text-based
49
knowledge based on “new manufactures.” The Statute of Anne, as later
interpreted in Donaldson, drew a related but different line between
society and the state, based on “author”-ship, or what was to take on the
color of creativity or novelty. The epistemological account recited in the
last Section, and the Scientific Revolution that took place during the
seventeenth century, together suggest that the idea of knowledge as
represented in “manufactures” and in books was, even then, potentially
unstable. It is no surprise that the bases for allocating authority over
these things should have been less than stable as well.
C. Elite and Vernacular Knowledge
Philosophy and politics intersect with important but independent
social and cultural themes. As the Scientific Revolution approached, the
useful or mechanical arts—including the craft of printing, the trade that
was responsible for the production and distribution of books—were, as
Pamela Smith suggests, rather broadly distributed in the hands (literally)
of the people, who organized themselves into companies and guilds and
passed their knowledge from hand to hand (hand to eye, hand to ear,
50
and so forth) via craft objects and personal instruction. This was
vernacular knowledge. The practitioners of the liberal arts, scholars, were
found among elite institutions: universities, the church, the state, and
particularly courts. Their knowledge was encoded in texts, access to
which was generally limited to other members of the elite. Theoretical
knowledge (knowledge of the mind) was relatively concentrated;
practical knowledge (knowledge of the hand) was relatively distributed.

47
See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual
Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 921 (2010) (arguing that the output limiting
effects of intellectual property law can be used to suppress the production of socially
harmful information).
48
See HAROLD G. FOX, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND
FUTURE OF THE PATENT MONOPOLY 115–16 (1947); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the
Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1265–
72 (2001).
49
Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
50
SMITH, supra note 19, at 7–8.
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The Scientific Revolution, the Statute of Monopolies, and the Statute
of Anne and its aftermath had, in combination, a profound effect on the
production and distribution of knowledge in terms of its mapping onto
elite and vernacular segments of society. Natural philosophers, new
scholars, succeeded to claims of artisanal or practical knowledge of
nature, giving presumptively elite status to what had been vernacular
practice. The practical implications of this shift were substantial. The
previous Section explored how the long wake of the Statute of
Monopolies, the Statute of Anne, and the judgment in Donaldson not only
took the Crown out of the business of monopoly privileges but also took
the Stationers’ Company out of the business of regulating text. The
future of knowledge regulation for both books and machines was to be
the concept of property—patent and copyright, linked to capital and
51
social class, rather than craft.
The social value of science, or knowledge of nature, as represented
in things, therefore moved from its vernacular roots to a more elite
position, but this was an elite position measured by civil society organized
by money and power rather than by craft or discipline. The social value
of literature, or knowledge of the mind and spirit as represented in text,
moved in the opposite direction. In modern terms, eighteenth century
England set the stage for a massive democratization of knowledge during
the nineteenth century. Practical knowledge, having become “scientific,”
grew more concentrated; theoretical knowledge grew more distributed.
In neither case was this shift absolute, because at the heart of both
moves was text itself, the embodiment of classical theoretical or
conceptual knowledge and the necessarily elite form of representation
and transmission of newly naturalized knowledge. For present purposes,
therefore, more important than the absolute direction of either shift is
the tension between elite and vernacular claims to the production of
knowledge, to access to knowledge, and the relationship between the
two. Crucially, when the scholarly elite adopted the epistemological
stance of their artisanal forebears, the idea of nature as a route to
knowledge was married to the text-oriented practices of traditional
scholars. Knowledge would be produced by hand, but shared in print.
Commerce in books was necessarily aligned with the practices of the
cultural elite.
In other words, as both copyright and patent evolved during the
eighteenth century, the relationships among text, machine, and
vernacular and elite audiences remained central to both knowledge
practices and to law. Perhaps the most fundamental advances in the
modern conception of patent law stem from English law of the late
eighteenth century: the idea that an invention and rights in that
invention should be measured by what patent law today refers to as the
PHOSITA and that the invention be measured by a published description

51

See JOHNS, supra note 26, at 140.
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of what the inventor had produced over and beyond “principles,” or what
52
we would today call “laws of nature” and “abstract ideas.” Both doctrines
can be understood as efforts to help audiences make sense of the
relationship between word and object, but they did so in a way that gave
specific structure to ideas regarding the social structures surrounding
access to and production of knowledge. English courts concluded that no
invention was subject to claims of property (as against the general public
good) until and unless it was rendered in some published (i.e., authored)
form, and the criterion for satisfactory publication (i.e., specification)
was that “a skilled craftsman in an appropriate field must be able to
53
replicate the device from the document.” Patent law and patent practice
thereby acquired their modern cast as methods of “teaching.” The
knowledge to be communicated was abstracted for transmission purposes
and made part of the modern patent bargain: exclusive rights in
54
exchange for disclosure. The elite reader became the measure of
55
public, or vernacular, interests in knowledge. Later in the eighteenth
century, James Madison similarly recognized a link between the distinct
interests in knowledge represented by individual creators and the mass of
readers and customers. Concerning the wisdom of Congressional power
to enact protection for authors and inventors, he wrote: “The copy right
of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at
common law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to
belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases,
56
with the claims of individuals.”
52
In contemporary American patent law, these doctrines appear in the Patent
Act in sections 103 (nonobviousness) and 112 (written description and specification).
35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112 (2006).
53
Liardet v. Johnson, (1778) 62 Eng. Rep. 1000 (K.B.), 1 CARPMAEL’S PATENT
CASES 35, 37 (London, A Macintosh 1843) (emphasizing the significance of teaching
via a specification); JOHNS, supra note 26, at 140–41 (citing Morris v. Bransom, (1776)
Bull. N.P. 76, 1 CARPMAEL’S PATENT CASES 30, 34 (London, A. Macintosh 1843)
(Mansfield, C.J.) (affirming the validity of a patent upon an improvement to an
existing machine, signifying that progress, rather than the machine itself, was the
touchstone of patent law). The relevant portion of the report of Liardet is:

The meaning of the specification is, that others may be taught to do the thing
for which the patent is granted; and if the specification is false, the patent is void,
for after the term the public ought to have the benefit of the discovery. Hence
the law requires as the price the patentee should pay to the public for his
monopoly, that he should, to the very best of his knowledge, give the fullest and
most sufficient description of all the particulars on which the effect depends.

Id.
54

See Mossoff, supra note 48, at 1288–92.
The development of the idea of the “author” in late eighteenth century and
nineteenth century literary property concepts plausibly signifies a comparable
development in copyright law, the social production of an elite guide to a domain of
knowledge designed for vernacular consumption. See Martha Woodmansee, The
Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author,’ 17
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES 425, 426, 430–37, 445 (1984).
56
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 234 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
55
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III. ISOLATING AND PURIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S
SUBJECT MATTER
In this Part, I offer a brief and high-level overview of significant
developments in the law of the subject matter of American intellectual
property disciplines, measured primarily by key opinions of the Supreme
Court of the United States. This overview suggests how the themes
described in Part II were manifested in later legal developments—and,
eventually, how the dynamism and stresses apparent in my descriptions
above abated—after the law made its way across the Atlantic.
England in the eighteenth century witnessed only the beginnings of
modern intellectual property law. Later English developments and
American developments each have had their own distinct narratives and
influences. The early history is relevant because it helps modern readers
interpret later developments, particularly from the standpoint of the
separate domains of patent law, copyright law, and even trademark law,
and not because modern law should align with the form or structure of
its antecedents. I do not claim that modern law has been or should be
limited specifically by those historical patterns. My point is precisely the
opposite: The patterns identified in Part II are historically contingent,
limited by the social, economic, technological, philosophical, and
political conditions of their times, but they gave birth to what we now call
patent law, copyright law, and even, to a degree, trademark law. The later
evolution of those doctrines occurred in the light and shadow of those
same patterns, as courts, legislators, and litigants explored and developed
the issues and questions that were first framed 300 years ago.
The themes identified in Part II—the distinction between artisanal
and artistic claims to knowledge, the distinction between state and society
as arbiter of claims to knowledge, and the distinction between elite and
vernacular arguments about the value of knowledge—illuminate the
rough outlines of the point that I made in the Introduction. In the two
centuries since the establishment of federal patent and copyright law, the
Supreme Court of the United States (and Congress, often responding to
the Court) has moved gradually but clearly in the direction of identifying
subject matter questions that have the effect of isolating each of these
disciplines from any other. There is nothing inherently wrong about that
evolution; in many respects it is to be expected in a common law system
and a maturing market economy increasingly dominated by industry. But
as the several conditions implicit in that summary now begin to
dissipate—the line between materiality and literacy blurs, the line
between state and society blurs, and the line between elite and vernacular
blurs—an approach dominated by doctrinal segregation and channeling
loses its traction in a pluralistic society and a diverse economy. The Court
and the law might find traction anew by returning to ancient themes with
fresh eyes and ears; it might find traction by identifying new themes in
current conditions. The next Part explores that topic in a preliminary
way.
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The following is not an exhaustive account of the cases. They are
used to illustrate by example, and in chronological order, how the
subject matter domains of the three major intellectual property
disciplines emerged, originally and explicitly in the shadow of older
patterns, and later, independent of them. The chronological ordering is
purposeful. By disrupting a retrospective effort to order and organize the
cases by legal rule, I want to emphasize how the Court’s jurisprudence
moved from a position of greater recognition of the integrated character
of what I (retrospectively) call knowledge to a position where that
integration seems far less possible, and I want to emphasize the somewhat
disordered progression of the history of intellectual property law as a
whole.
A. Nineteenth Century Cases
57

Pennock v. Dialogue dealt with an early version of what is now
referred to as the on-sale bar to patenting, the idea that an invention
cannot be the subject of a patent if it has previously been on sale to the
58
public at large for more than a statutory period of time. The Court
distinguished the inventor’s role as an (elite) inventor from his possible
status as a (commercial) proprietor, which would invalidate the patent:
While one great object [of the patent statute] was, by holding out a
reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right
to their inventions for a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of
genius; the main object was “to promote the progress of science and
useful arts;” and this could be done best, by giving the public at
large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented,
at as early a period as possible; having a due regard to the rights of
the inventor. If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from
the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he
should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and make,
and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of
it, relying upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure;
and then, and then only, when the danger of competition should
force him to secure the exclusive right, he should be allowed to
take out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any farther use
than what should be derived under it during his fourteen years; it
would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts,
and give a premium to those who should be least prompt to
59
communicate their discoveries.
Wheaton v. Peters was the first major opinion of the Court to deal with
copyright, and as copyright scholars know well, the Court concluded that
the federal copyright statute, with its limited term and scope of rights,
extinguished the concept of literary property with respect to works that
57
58
59

27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
Id. at 23–24. See also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65 (1998).
Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 19.
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60

fell within its scope. This brought American law into line with its
English cousin. As debates preceding the judgment in Donaldson had
done, the Court justified its conclusion by drawing an explicit parallel
between an author and inventor:
In what respect does the right of an author differ from that of an
individual who has invented a most useful and valuable machine? In
the production of this, his mind has been as intensely engaged, as
long; and, perhaps, as usefully to the public, as any distinguished
author in the composition of his book.
The result of their labours may be equally beneficial to society,
and in their respective spheres they may be alike distinguished for
mental vigour. Does the common law give a perpetual right to the
author, and withhold it from the inventor? And yet it has never
been pretended that the latter could hold, by the common law, any
61
property in his invention, after he shall have sold it publicly.
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood is remembered as a key source of the
proposition that invention should be measured against the concept of
the “ordinary mechanic,” whose output is not, in the main, worthy of
62
legal recognition. The Court in Hotchkiss spoke, as it did in Wheaton, of a
contrast between efforts of the hand (the mechanic) and of the mind (in
this case, the inventor):
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of
fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application
of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention. In other words, the
improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the
63
inventor.
64

O’Reilly v. Morse is famous for its invalidation of the eighth claim of
Samuel Morse’s patent on telegraphy, on the ground that it too broadly
claimed an exclusive right to “the use of the motive power of the electric
or galvanic current, which [the inventor calls] electro-magnetism,
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, letters,
65
or signs, at any distances.” Later courts and many scholars interpret the
case as invalidating Morse’s claim on the ground that Morse had not
invented the natural principle of electro-magnetism, which could not be
66
patented in any event. An equally good and more useful reading of the
60

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
Id. at 657–58.
62
52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851).
63
Id.
64
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
65
Id. at 86, 120.
66
See, e.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1888); Alan L. Durham,
Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement, 93 MINN. L. REV. 933, 940 (2009); Robert A.
61
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opinion is that Professor Morse had invented a new telegraphic device
but had failed to adequately reduce that device to a textual form that
corresponded to the breadth of his invention.
Winans v. Denmead was an early application of what became known as
the doctrine of equivalents in patent law, testing the limits of the
proposition that the text of an inventor’s written specification defined
67
the thing invented and limited the patent right. Notably, the case was
decided in the era before patent practice adopted the expectation of
peripheral claiming, the idea that the language of the patent’s claims
defined the outer limit of the invention. Rather than establishing the
principle of equivalents, therefore, the Court was emphasizing the
importance of fair interpretation of the inventor’s claim, using a
rhetorical framework that looked to differentiate an inventive idea from
68
a particular machine. The Court wrote, distinguishing the nature of the
plaintiff’s inventiveness from the defendant’s copying:
Merely to change the form of a machine is the work of a
constructor, not of an inventor; such a change cannot be deemed
an invention. Nor does the plaintiff’s patent rest upon such a
change. To change the form of an existing machine, and by means
of such change to introduce and employ other mechanical
principles or natural powers, or, as it is termed, a new mode of
operation, and thus attain a new and useful result, is the subject of a
69
patent. Such is the basis on which the plaintiff’s patent rests.
....
Where form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look
at the form only. Where they are separable; where the whole
substance of the invention may be copied in a different form, it is
the duty of courts and juries to look through the form for the
substance of the invention—for that which entitled the inventor to
his patent, and which the patent was designed to secure; where that
is found, there is an infringement; and it is not a defence, that it is
embodied in a form not described, and in terms claimed by the
70
patentee.
71

Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., still cited today on the question of whether
use of an invention before a patent application is filed invalidates a

Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The
Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 69 (1999).
67
56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1854).
68
See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and
Claiming the Future, Part I (1790–1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 393–98
(2005).
69
Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 341.
70
Id. at 343.
71
97 U.S. 126 (1878).
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patent because it was undertaken publicly or (instead) experimentally,
relied on a crucial distinction between the inventor acting as, in effect, a
scientist, and the inventor acting as a commercial proprietor:
In either case, such use is not a public use, within the meaning of
the statute, so long as the inventor is engaged, in good faith, in
testing its operation. He may see cause to alter it and improve it, or
not. His experiments will reveal the fact whether any and what
alterations may be necessary. If durability is one of the qualities to
be attained, a long period, perhaps years, may be necessary to
enable the inventor to discover whether his purpose is
accomplished. And though, during all that period, he may not find
that any changes are necessary, yet he may be justly said to be using
his machine only by way of experiment; and no one would say that
such a use, pursued with a bona fide intent of testing the qualities of
the machine, would be a public use, within the meaning of the
statute. So long as he does not voluntarily allow others to make it
and use it, and so long as it is not on sale for general use, he keeps
the invention under his own control, and does not lose his title to a
73
patent.
In The Trade-Mark Cases, the Court was asked to identify a valid basis
for a federal trademark statute, rather than the legitimate scope of
74
copyright or patent law. The Court spoke principally in negative terms:
trademarks were not “founded in the creative powers of the mind,” akin
to copyrighted writings, and could be (and ordinarily are) protected via
long periods of use, rather than via demonstrations of originality or
75
invention or other “work of the brain.” “[I]n neither case does it
depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It
requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It is
76
simply founded on priority of appropriation.” That distinction took
trademark law beyond the scope of Congressional power to act under the
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, which extends only to
77
authors and inventors, and to their respective writings and discoveries.
78
Baker v. Selden, usually invoked today as a foundational case for
copyright’s distinction between unprotected idea and protected
79
expression, has been shown convincingly to have depended originally
on the Court’s sense of the divide between the subject matters of

72

See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1362 (Fed
Cir. 2010); Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
73
Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 135.
74
100 U.S. 82 (1879).
75
Id. at 94.
76
Id.
77
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
78
101 U.S. 99 (1880).
79
See, e.g., Frye v. YMCA Camp Kitaki, 617 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2010); Kay
Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2005).
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80

copyright and patent. One might translate that divide thematically into
the divide between text and machine, between text and process, or
between text and principle; all are represented to a degree in the
81
opinion. Selden’s system of forms for double-entry bookkeeping could
not be protected by copyright, according to the Court, because Selden
was in effect asking for protection for the art to be practiced by the
system, and that protection could be given only by the Patent Office, if at
all:
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art
described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever
been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the
public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. The
claim to an invention or discovery of an art or manufacture must be
subjected to the examination of the Patent Office before an
exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured
82
by a patent from the government.
83

Tilghman v. Proctor took up the nature of invention, holding that the
emergence of a process in a prior context, by accident and without
consciousness or awareness of its significance as an invention, did not bar
patenting that same process by a later inventor working intentionally,
that is, as an inventor:
We do not regard the accidental formation of fat acid in
Perkins’s steam cylinder from the tallow introduced to lubricate the
piston (if the scum which rose on the water issuing from the
ejection pipe was fat acid) as of any consequence in this inquiry.
What the process was by which it was generated or formed was
never fully understood. Those engaged in the art of making
candles, or in any other art in which fat acids are desirable,
certainly never derived the least hint from this accidental
phenomenon in regard to any practicable process for
manufacturing such acids.
The accidental effects produced in Daniell’s water barometer
and in Walther’s process for purifying fats and oils preparatory to
soap-making, are of the same character. They revealed no process
for the manufacture of fat acids. If the acids were accidentally and
unwittingly produced, whilst the operators were in pursuit of other
and different results, without exciting attention and without its even
being known what was done or how it had been done, it would be
84
absurd to say that this was an anticipation of Tilghman’s discovery.

80
See Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction
Between Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159, 175–78 (Jane
C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
81
See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.
82
Id.
83
102 U.S. 707 (1881).
84
Id. at 711–12.
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Tilghman is generally regarded as the foundational case for the
doctrine of anticipation by inherency, which has been rationalized
according to the principle that an accidental or “inherent” invention may
not put the device (or process) at the disposal of the public, and
therefore ought not to be treated as a relevant part of the patent
85
bargain. It is not, in a legal sense or a disciplinary sense, a relevant form
of knowledge.
86
Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co. was the first case
at the Court to address the intersection of patent law and what has
become known as the law of trade dress, a species of unfair competition
and trademark law. The Court concluded that the expiration of patents
on Singer’s sewing machines gave competitors the right, as a matter of
law, to produce machines in the distinctive shape used by Singer,
notwithstanding Singer’s argument that by doing so the defendant had
87
engaged in acts of unfair competition. The Court thus began to give
shape to the public domain at the end of the life of a patent, as in O’Reilly
it had begun to give shape to the public domain at a patent’s beginning.
B. Early Twentieth Century Cases
As the twentieth century dawned, the Court’s intellectual property
jurisprudence reflected each of the themes described in Part II, in one
respect or another: the relationship between nature and invention,
between text and machine, between art and science, between inventors
and the commercial and consuming public, and between the state and
society. In no case had a definitive line been drawn, but in broad outline
and in the shadow of the Industrial Revolution the Court was developing
and displaying a sense that a law of knowledge, guided by context and
legal discipline, was emerging. As the Industrial Revolution drew to a
close, the economic and social lessons of the nineteenth century—
including the benefits and costs of social, political, and economic
hierarchy and the virtues of access to capital and information—were
consolidated, absorbed, and then extended during the twentieth century.
As a turn-of-the-century case, Singer Manufacturing Co. is exemplary in this
regard: the Court justified the outcome of the case in the name of the
respective “property” claims of the parties, property being partly a
88
metaphor for a legal right. The plaintiff’s patent having expired, the
89
right to produce the relevant machines became “public” property, and
any alleged injury to the plaintiff’s remaining property interest—what
modern trademark law likely would refer to as “goodwill”—was

85

See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 383–
84 (2005).
86
163 U.S. 169 (1896).
87
Id. at 185.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 185, 203.
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90

The relevant knowledge interests were becoming
immaterial.
increasingly abstracted and differentiated for purposes of legal and
economic markets. On the expiration of the patent, the public was
entitled not to the knowledge of the inventor, but to “the right to make
91
the machine in the form in which it was constructed during the patent.”
However, the subtle shift in rhetoric is indicative of a deeper conceptual
progression.
92
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. evidenced and extended that
conceptual approach in the context of copyright law. The Court
concluded that the subject matter of copyright consisted of “the copy”
(today we would say “an original” work), which Justice Holmes wrote:
is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even
in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man’s alone. That something he may
93
copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.
The Court was doing for copyright what it had previously done for
patents in O’Reilly—define the subject matter of the law with reference to
the natural world—but now in more abstract terms. With respect to
adjacent issues, the representation of legally protected material, and the
definition of that material by a disciplinary community or by the state,
the Court abdicated:
Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts
because their pictorial quality attracts the crowd and therefore gives
them a real use—if use means to increase trade and to help to make
money. A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a
subject of copyright that it is used for an advertisement.
....
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to
miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive
until the public had learned the new language in which their
author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether
the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end,
copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public
less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of
any public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to say

90
91
92
93

Id. at 185.
Id.
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
Id. at 250.
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that they have not an aesthetic and educational value—and the
94
taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.
95

Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. pushed an equally
abstract framework in the patent context. The case involved the
argument that a patentee who did not practice the patent was not
entitled to invoke the equitable powers of the court to preserve the
96
exclusivity of his patent right. The Court rejected this argument.
Patents, it noted, were species of property and their exclusivity was a
97
matter of right. But the Court noted the special status of inventors and
the distinct services that justified their special treatment:
In other words, the language of complete monopoly has been
employed, and though at first only a remedy at law was given for a
violation of the right, a remedy in equity was given as early as 1819.
There has been no qualification, however, of the right, except as
hereinafter stated. An exception which, we may now say, shows the
extent of the right—a right so explicitly given and so complete that
it would seem to need no further explanation than the word of the
statute. It has, however, received explanation in a number of cases
which bring out clearly the services rendered by an inventor to the
arts and sciences and to the public. Those cases declare that he
receives nothing from the law that he did not have before, and that
the only effect of the patent is to restrain others from
manufacturing and using that which he has invented. And it was
further said in that case that the inventor could have kept his
discovery to himself, but to induce a disclosure of it Congress has,
by its legislation, made in pursuance of the Constitution,
guaranteed to him an exclusive right to it for a limited time, and
the purpose of the patent is to protect him in this monopoly—not
to give him a use which he did not have before, “but only to
98
separate to him an exclusive use.”
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., another copyright case,
determined that reproduction of a copyrighted musical composition by
means of a player piano roll did not constitute making an infringing
99
“copy” of the protected work. Congress promptly changed the law—a
copy of a work has infringed ever since, even if the copy could be
understood by humans only via an intervening mechanical or electronic
100
process. Mostly lost to later history is the fact that the Court was
mindful of the relationship between public and expert audiences:

94

Id. at 251–52.
210 U.S. 405 (1908).
96
Id. at 406–07.
97
Id. at 429.
98
Id. at 423–24 (quoting United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224,
249 (1897)) (citation omitted).
99
209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
100
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (definition of “copies”).
95
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The fact is clearly established in the testimony in this case that even
those skilled in the making of these rolls are unable to read them as
musical compositions, as those in staff notation are read by the
performer. It is true that there is some testimony to the effect that
great skill and patience might enable the operator to read this
record as he could a piece of music written in staff notation. But the
weight of the testimony is emphatically the other way, and they are
not intended to be read as an ordinary piece of sheet music, which
to those skilled in the art conveys, by reading, in playing or singing,
101
definite impressions of the melody.

This likely should be read as a statement that no expert musicianship
should be required to assess copyright infringement; the “ordinary”
public should be the relevant standard. The reference to those “skilled in
the art” shows that the Court, as in Bleistein, intended to contrast the case
with the sensibility of patent law.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus dealt with the enforceability of a restrictive
legend printed in each copy of a copyrighted book, purporting to limit
102
the price at which further re-sales of those copies could occur. The
103
Court held that the legend was not enforceable, giving twentieth
century force to what has become known as the first sale doctrine in
104
copyright, a cousin of the exhaustion doctrine in patent law. Much of
the opinion is given over to reciting and distinguishing a line of Supreme
Court cases in patent law that gave effect to restrictive legends printed or
105
stamped on particular copies of patented items. In contrast to Wheaton
v. Peters, in which parallels between copyright and patent law persuaded
the Court to treat the two statutes as essentially identical in their effect on
106
existing claims of property right, in Bobbs-Merrill, the Court emphasized
their differences:
We may say in passing, disclaiming any intention to indicate our
views as to what would be the rights of parties in circumstances
similar to the present case under the patent laws, that there are
differences between the patent and copyright statutes in the extent
of the protection granted by them. This was recognized by Judge
Lurton, who wrote a leading case on the subject in the Federal
courts (The Button Fastener Case, 77 Fed. Rep. 288), for he said in the
subsequent case of Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 Fed. Rep. 24:
“There are such wide differences between the right of
multiplying and vending copies of a production protected by the
copyright statute and the rights secured to an inventor under the

101

White-Smith Music Publ’g Co., 209 U.S. at 18.
210 U.S. 339, 341–43 (1908).
103
Id. at 351.
104
See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (allowing resale of a lawfully made copy by its
owner).
105
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 343–46.
106
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657–58 (1834).
102
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patent statutes, that the cases which relate to the one subject are
107
not altogether controlling as to the other.”
108

Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. affirmed and extended the
principle developed in Singer: The expiration of a patent gave the
public—including competitors—the right to practice the invention
represented in the patent, even to the extent that the result of the
competition was to produce a thing that copied the distinctive
109
appearance of the patented product. In Kellogg, this was “shredded
110
wheat” breakfast cereal. The Court’s opinion is less than clear as to the
precise basis for the result, but its tenor was clear. The Court confirmed
that the plaintiff’s property in the design and manufacture of the cereal
had passed from a limited domain regulated by the state to the broader
public marketplace and was subject only to ongoing duties, grounded in
the law of unfair competition, to avoid deception:
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the
article known as “Shredded Wheat”; and thus is sharing in a market
which was created by the skill and judgment of plaintiff’s
predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expenditures in
advertising persistently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the
exercise of a right possessed by all—and in the free exercise of
which the consuming public is deeply interested. There is no
evidence of passing off or deception on the part of the Kellogg
Company; and it has taken every reasonable precaution to prevent
111
confusion or the practice of deception in the sale of its product.
C. Mid-Twentieth Century Cases
Cases decided in the middle part of the twentieth century continued
the process of abstracting and dividing patent questions from copyright
questions from trademark questions. The Court’s jurisprudence
necessarily absorbed the instructions of Congress (which had in many
instances absorbed the teachings of earlier Supreme Court cases), with
112
new statutes in each field: a new Copyright Act in 1909, the Lanham
113
114
Act in 1946, and the Patent Act in 1952. As lawyers and judges refined
the understanding of intellectual property rights as legal abstractions
governing knowledge-based abstractions (inventions, works of
authorship, and marks), the Court gradually grew more comfortable with
107

Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 345–46 (quoting Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153
F. 24, 28 (6th Cir. 1907)).
108
305 U.S. 111 (1938).
109
Id. at 118.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 122 (footnote omitted).
112
Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
113
Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
114
Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
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sharp subject matter definitions for patent, copyright, and trademark law
that often allowed multiple forms of right to co-exist in a single
intangible thing.
115
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. invalidated patent claims
to certain strains of the Rhizobium bacteria combined as an inoculant,
on the ground that the inventor had claimed merely a product (or
properties) of the natural world, “like the heat of the sun, electricity, or
the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and
116
reserved exclusively to none.”
117
Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.
introduced the modern doctrine of equivalents to patent law, extending
the scope of patent claims (now written as peripheral claims) beyond
118
their literal scope, as interpreted. The “principle” of the invention
became a free-floating thing, protected in law from “fraud” on the patent
at the hands of knowledgeable but unscrupulous artisans, that is, fellow
119
experts. The Court wrote:
An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art
would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not
contained in the patent with one that was.
A finding of equivalence is a determination of fact. Proof can be
made in any form: through testimony of experts or others versed in
the technology; by documents, including texts and treatises; and, of
course, by the disclosures of the prior art. Like any other issue of
fact, final determination requires a balancing of credibility,
persuasiveness and weight of evidence. It is to be decided by the
trial court and that court’s decision, under general principles of
appellate review, should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
Particularly is this so in a field where so much depends upon
familiarity with specific scientific problems and principles not
usually contained in the general storehouse of knowledge and
120
experience.
Under such circumstances, the accused infringer was likely to be a fellow
member of the art but would be deemed to be acting deceptively, as a
121
rival rather than as a fellow inventor.

115

333 U.S. 127 (1948).
Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
117
339 U.S. 605 (1950).
118
See id. at 607–09.
119
Id. at 608–09.
120
Id. at 609–10.
121
In that regard, the Court distinguished Graver Tank from Westinghouse v.
Boyden Power Brake Co., the case often regarded as the establishing the “reverse”
doctrine of equivalents. 170 U.S. 537 (1898). Under some circumstances, a finding of
noninfringement is appropriate in a case where the patent reads on the accused
device, because the defendant has engaged in a clear process of invention. Id. at 568.
116
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Mazer v. Stein concluded that a three-dimensional object could be
protected by copyright notwithstanding the fact that it was part of a
manufactured (that is, industrial) object, in a case that extended but
modified the Court’s effort in Baker to comprehend the relationship
123
between the scope of copyright and the scope of patent. As a suitable
level of abstraction, the two intellectual property regimes could co-exist
124
in a single product.
125
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
126
Lighting, Inc., a pair of cases decided on the same day, reinforced the
reasoning applied in Singer and Kellogg and ruled that the inventor of an
unpatented device (in this case, a pole lamp and a fluorescent light
fixture) could not pursue state law unfair competition claims against
127
competitors who copied the designs of those devices. The invalidation
or absence of patent rights left the design of the subject device in the
128
public domain. Because the federal government had determined the
applicable level of intellectual property protection, no state could offer
common law protection for the design under general commercial law
129
principles, consistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Sears/Compco is a landmark in the law of the public domain for patentable
subject matter, but it is of a piece with Wheaton in clarifying the respective
roles of the state and the commercial sphere in the regulation of
knowledge.
130
Graham v. John Deere Co. provided the Court’s most thorough
explanation to date of the proposition that patentability is to be
measured by the knowledge of the PHOSITA. The knowledge and skill
(head and hand) of this hypothetical person should be used to measure
the nonobviousness of an invention, under section 103 of the Patent
131
Act. Graham modernized the original purpose of the faith that patent
law placed in the skilled artisan. Expert knowledge was intended to
constrain the power exercised by the state, as guardian of the broader
public interest:
While we have focused attention on the appropriate standard to
be applied by the courts, it must be remembered that the primary
responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent
Office. To await litigation is—for all practical purposes—to
debilitate the patent system. We have observed a notorious

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

347 U.S. 201 (1954).
See id. at 217–18.
Id. at 217.
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 231–32; Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237–38.
Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237–38.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 231.
383 U.S. 1 (1966).
See id. at 17–18.
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difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and
by the courts. While many reasons can be adduced to explain the
discrepancy, one may well be the free rein often exercised by
132
Examiners in their use of the concept of “invention.”

D. Late Twentieth Century Cases
My brief digests of older cases suggest ways in which the Court’s
patent, copyright, and trademark jurisprudence might be linked to
historic knowledge-oriented themes in intellectual property law, even if
the Court itself was not always explicit in drawing those themes into its
cases. By the late twentieth century, the Court’s jurisprudence in patent,
copyright, and trademark law appears to have stabilized sufficiently that
the Court tended to look inward, to the contemporary dynamics of each
of these disciplines, rather than to broader themes concerning
133
knowledge that connect them to law, practice, nature, and society.
Patentable subject matter increasingly depended on the statutes, policies,
and needs of the patent system; likewise for copyright, and for
trademark—even where these doctrines ran up against each other.
Gottschalk v. Benson invalidated a patent on a method of data
processing on the ground that it constituted an abstract “algorithm,” or
an idea that was insufficiently connected to a specific apparatus or
134
application.
135
Diamond v. Chakrabarty upheld a patent on a human-manufactured
bacterium as a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the
meaning of the Patent Act, distinguishing Funk Bros. on the ground that
136
the bacterium was man-made. In so holding, the Court recognized that
137
“[h]is discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own.”
138
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. borrowed some
patent-style reasoning to resolve a copyright case, but in a way that made

132

Id. at 18.
The enactment of a new Copyright Act in 1976 enabled the Court to reset its
understanding of copyrightable subject matter in light of new statutory language
defining the scope of the law. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The creation of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in
patent cases, had a related impact, encouraging that court to look only to patent
doctrine and policy in developing an integrated and consistent body of patent
caselaw.
134
409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); but cf. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–93
(1981) (upholding a patent on an industrial process for molding rubber, rather
characterizing the claim as directed to a mathematical formula); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978) (invalidating a patent on a mathematical formula for
catalytic conversion alarm limits).
135
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
136
See id. at 309–10.
137
Id. at 310.
138
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
133
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clear that the Court regarded the two doctrines as distinct in
contemporary terms rather than of a single historical piece, despite their
139
acknowledged “kinship.” The Court adopted a variation of the “staple
article of commerce” doctrine from patent law and grafted it onto the
contributory infringement doctrine in copyright law in order to
exonerate the manufacturer of the Betamax videotape recorder from a
claim that it had inappropriately facilitated consumer reproduction of
140
television programming.
141
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. extended the reasoning
of Sears/Compco with respect to state power to create intellectual property
142
rights alongside the federal patent and copyright schemes. The Court
ruled that states could not legislate forms of exclusive rights that offered
143
patent-like protection to the designs of things or to their utility.
144
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. dealt again with
the subject matter of copyright law. Borrowing generously from the
Bleistein opinion, the Court set the bar for copyrightability about as low as
145
it could be set while still having some presence. To be copyrightable, a
work of authorship must be “original,” meaning that it must possess a
modicum of creativity and must have been created by the author, rather
146
than copied from some other source. By statute as well as by policy, no
government agency or review is required to make this determination ex
ante. The principle of Feist has obvious implications for the distribution
of the knowledge of modern scientists and inventors, given the practical
and legal requirements that their innovations be fully and fairly
described, typically in text, as part of the patent bargain. But the Court
did not refer to patent law.
147
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. concluded that interpretation
of patent claims should be the province of the court rather than the jury,
given the need for consistent interpretation of a given patent across
possible successive lawsuits and given the Court’s conclusion that
construction of patent claims is akin to the interpretation of written
instruments, rather than the identification of the thing that the inventor
148
produced.
139

Id. at 439.
See id. at 442, 456.
141
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
142
See id. at 167. See also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474
(1974) (holding that state trade secret law, which regulates knowledge by protecting
parties who refuse to share it, is compatible with federal patent law, which rewards
those same parties when they forego trade secret protection and disclose that
knowledge).
143
Id. at 168.
144
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
145
Id. at 358–59.
146
Id. at 345.
147
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
148
Id. at 388–91.
140
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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. revisited the scope of
trademark protection for the designs of things, in this case dresses made
149
of seersucker fabric and bearing appliqués. The Court focused on the
different rules relevant to “product configuration” cases and “product
packaging” cases. It noted that stricter standards for trademark
protection should apply to the former, partly in order to avoid conflict
with patent law, particularly design patent law, and partly because of the
lesser likelihood that a product configuration would, in the course of
150
things, be treated by consumers as an identifier of source.
E. Twenty-First Century Cases
The most recent Supreme Court cases continue the pattern of
refinement of the abstraction that constitutes the subject matter of each
field according to the bounds largely identified by statute, precedent,
and related public policy. Any sense that these abstractions relate to
underlying philosophical, social, and political interests in knowledge—a
sense that may help the Court apprehend the implications and overlaps
among intellectual property disciplines—has mostly, though not
completely, disappeared.
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. addressed the impact of
patenting on the availability of trade dress protection for design features
151
previously disclosed in a utility patent. The Court concluded that the
bar to trade dress protection was not absolute, but it held: “Where the
expired patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to
establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing
that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely
152
an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.” The Court
did not, and perhaps could not, resolve the rhetorical and conceptual
inconsistency between the idea of the claims and limitations of a patent,
which define its scope, and the specification of the source-signifying
features alleged to exist in a particular form of product configuration
claimed as trade dress.
Eldred v. Ashcroft found that congressional power to set and extend
the “limited” term of statutory copyrights was limited, if at all, by the
concept that congressional authority extends to what the Court called the
153
“traditional contours of copyright protection.” The Court’s analysis was
“inform[ed]” by the historical practice of Congress with respect to patent
154
policy, but the Court also noted clearly that the structure of patent law,

149
150
151
152
153
154

529 U.S. 205, 207 (2000).
Id. at 212–14.
532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
Id. at 30.
537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
Id. at 201–04.
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and the quid pro quo bargain that metaphorically cabins each issued
155
patent, does not similarly define copyright.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. involved the
interpretation of a specific subsection of the Lanham Act in the context
of a film that had once been the subject of copyright protection, but is
156
now in the public domain. Had the new distributor of the film falsely
represented the “origin” of the film when it labeled the film and package
157
with its own name rather than the name of the copyright owner? The
Court held that liability for a false designation of origin could not attach,
because “origin” in its statutory context referred to the physical object
158
rather than to the expressive context. The Court reasoned that such a
rule would not only protect consumer expectations regarding goods but
would also preserve copyright and trademark as separate legal and
commercial domains; it would, the Court said, prevent the emergence of
a form of “mutant copyright” that would limit the public’s right to copy
159
material in the public domain.
A handful of more recent cases suggest some interest at the Court in
moving away from a highly specialized, internal perspective on each
intellectual property domain and toward a sense that intellectual
property fields are subject to some of the same pressures and
opportunities as social activity generally. That trend is still inchoate; it is
too new to comprise a tendency to look at intellectual property law in
160
more integrative terms. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
the Court held that secondary liability in copyright could be imposed
according to general standards applicable to tort cases, including the
idea of intentional inducement of a tort, rather than according to the
161
In eBay Inc. v.
copyright-specific framework announced in Sony.
MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court ruled that the availability of final
equitable relief under the Patent Act should be governed by the same
162
general standards as equitable relief in other civil litigation. In KSR v.
163
Teleflex, the Court refined its understanding of the PHOSITA, as
specified in Graham, such that in an appropriate case the knowledge of
the skilled artisan might be informed by the judgment of the field as well
164
as by specific teachings of identified pieces of prior art. “A person of
165
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”

155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 217 n.22.
539 U.S. 23, 25–26 (2003).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 34.
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
Id. at 936–37.
547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
Id. at 415–18.
Id. at 421.
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Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. endorsed a broad reading of
the patent exhaustion principle, limiting an inventor’s exclusive rights in
patent as applied to a particular item embodying the invention after that
166
item has been sold. The Court held that exhaustion is applicable to
method claims as well as to product claims, so long as the relevant
167
transaction constituted an authorized sale of a relevant product. “The
authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts
the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking
168
patent law to control postsale use of the article.” The Court appeared
to be attempting to align patent law generally with a common-sense
distinction between patent rights (products of the head) and tangible
goods (products of the hand). But the opinion is heavily invested in the
Court’s own precedents having to do with restrictive notices and licenses
applied to patented products, and in the details of the patent-related
169
transactions among the parties in the case. There is no fair way to read
Quanta as engaging explicitly in an analysis of the law of knowledge.
IV. AUTHORSHIP AND INVENTION IN BILSKI
In the interest of space, I have not catalogued all intellectual
property cases from the Supreme Court. The trends that I describe as
moving toward further and further specialization of each domain of
intellectual property law are imperfect and incomplete. The divorce of
artisanal applications of knowledge from artistic ones, of elite
interpretations of knowledge from vernacular ones, of state-based forms
and sanctions for knowledge from society-based forms and sanctions, and
of knowledge-related considerations in any intellectual property
jurisprudence at this level is ongoing, even if the Court’s most recent
opinions suggest some evidence of a reversal. On the whole, patent law
has come to be seen in the Court’s precedents as elite, artisanal, and
state-sanctioned—to the extent that it continues to be informed at all by
its relationship with knowledge as I described it earlier. In what remains
of the relationship between knowledge and copyright, that body of law
has come to be seen as vernacular, artistic, and social. Trademark law has
come to be seen as vernacular, artisanal, and simultaneously statesanctioned and social. But trademark law is now almost exclusively a
matter of commerce, divorced from knowledge.
Where does Bilski v. Kappos fit in this account? The question in that
case was whether a “business method” constituted a potentially
patentable “process” within the meaning of that term in section 101 of
170
the Patent Act. The Court held that the method in question did not. It
166
167
168
169
170

128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 (2008).
Id. at 2117.
Id. at 2122.
See id. at 2115–17.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225, 3228 (2010).
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was abstract and therefore failed the traditional standard that abstract
171
ideas cannot be patented. The Federal Circuit had concluded that a
patentable process had to meet the “machine or transformation” test: A
process could be patented “if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or
172
thing.” The Supreme Court rejected that standard as the sole test of
patentability under section 101. The Court wrote:
This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-ortransformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative
tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are
processes under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not
the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible
173
“process.”
The outcome is decidedly inconclusive. Patent practitioners likely
will take little of real value from the case, and the question of patentable
subject matter will remain unresolved.
If patent law has come to be seen as elite, artisanal, and statesanctioned, then Bilski neither follows that pattern nor rejects it. The
fairest judgment may be that Bilski, like much of the Court’s twentieth
century intellectual property jurisprudence, takes essentially no position
on the relationship between patent law and questions of knowledge in
society. The opinion hedges its bets on whether its analytic perspective is
elite or vernacular. Is the Court’s subject matter perspective informed
primarily by the technical and technologically determined rules and
practices of patenting, measured by skilled artisanship, or is it based on
popular understanding? Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court decrees
that the statutory term “process” should be interpreted according to its
174
“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Yet it offers suggestions
that specialized (expert) meanings might apply, based on the Court’s
175
discussions of traditional exclusions from patentable subject matter.
Vernacular meanings seem to govern the knowledge governed by patent
law, the Court seems to say, except when expert meanings apply. Does
the Court rely on a mostly artisanal approach to the knowledge taught by
business methods? The conclusion that Bilski’s method failed the section
101 threshold can be justified on the ground that the method involved
more head than hand, in metaphorical terms, but the Court’s refusal to
reject business method claims as a class suggests that it is willing to accept
patenting of some more “artistic,” that is, conceptual but human-made
processes. The Court even equivocated with respect to patent law’s statesanctioned basis:

171
172
173
174
175

Id. at 3229–30.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
Id. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
See id.
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[The Information Age] puts the possibility of innovation in the
hands of more people and raises new difficulties for the patent law.
With ever more people trying to innovate and thus seeking patent
protections for their inventions, the patent law faces a great
challenge in striking the balance between protecting inventors and
not granting monopolies over procedures that others would
discover by independent, creative application of general principles.
Nothing in this opinion should be read to take a position on where
176
that balance ought to be struck.

The Court seems to be hinting that the patent system needs to take more
explicit account of the full range of innovative processes and practices
and other forms of knowledge that exist in society today. But the Court
also does not wish to take a position as to which “useful arts” should be
granted state sanction via the Patent Office. It is difficult to make too
much of this passage. The concurrence by Justice Stevens is not helpful,
either. The concurrence traces the contemporary term “process” through
the Patent Act to the Constitutional phrase “useful arts,” then finds what
we call “business methods” in current jargon missing from the scope of
177
that historical term and related patent practice. That approach has a
vaguely artisanal air, which Justice Stevens then disclaims; in his
description of relevant public policy, the idea of patents as instruments of
178
knowledge is almost entirely absent. The fact that the concurrence
attracted the votes of four Justices lays to rest the possibility that the
179
Court has any consistent view of broader knowledge themes.
V. CONCLUSION: A LAW OF KNOWLEDGE, IN WORD AND DEED
I suggested in the Introduction that the Supreme Court has painted
itself into a doctrinal corner with respect to subject matter questions in
intellectual property law. I meant that long ago the conceptual
antecedents of patent, copyright, and trademark law shared an interest in
big questions having to do with the role of knowledge in society.
Hundreds of years of doctrinal refinement have largely squeezed those
questions out of the law, and the remaining landscape of policy and
precedent does not offer a set of tools that is rich enough to enable the
Court—or lawyers, legislators, or policymakers working with the same
questions—to offer a persuasive analysis of contemporary subject matter
176

Id. at 3228.
Id. at 3245–48 (Stevens, J., concurring).
178
See id. at 3252–57 (Stevens, J., concurring); but see id. at 3254–55 (noting in
passing that patents on business methods do not encourage the disclosure of
anything that the “public”—a term that is not further specified—does not already
“know[]”). In light of the discussion of history and knowledge in Part II, one might
read the concurrence as suggesting that business methods are not forms of useful
knowledge because they are forms of useful knowledge. Either the meaning of the
concurrence is so obscure that it defies interpretation, or it has set out a standard that
would invalidate a vast range of modern patents on subject matter grounds.
179
Id. at 3231.
177
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problems. If all we had to worry about were books and machines, this
would not be worrisome. But of course we have to worry about much
more.
I also suggested in the Introduction that radically rethinking the
problem might be called for. I meant that the original questions and
themes that lawyers and courts encountered in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, having to do with changing forms of knowledge
and how those forms intersect with changing social, political, and
philosophical interests, may still be relevant today, but how we go about
answering those questions and addressing those themes may be quite
different. I also meant that a similarly thematic approach may be needed
today, even if the themes that emerge from examination of knowledge
problems in general—rather than as subdivided ex ante into patent,
copyright, and trademark problems—might be quite different. Today’s
contingent patterns may turn out to be quite different than the
contingent patterns of old England.
In a recent paper, I suggested that a similarly ambitious effort might
180
be appropriate with respect to knowledge interests in copyright law.
Taking social interests in knowledge as the normative baseline for all
aspects of intellectual property law, I offered a broad range of questions
applicable to any knowledge law regime, covering such broad subjects as
the language of knowledge law, the objects of knowledge law, roles and
rules for control and sharing in knowledge law, institutional and material
contexts for knowledge law, and distinction and integration of
181
independent knowledge law traditions, including patent and copyright.
All of those questions remain largely unexplored in the context of
twenty-first century social, economic, political, and economic conditions.
Bilski, for example, uses a literal and conceptual vocabulary derived from
late twentieth century caselaw. A more sensible modern reading of all of
intellectual property law as knowledge law would bring a broad array of
benefits to the legal system and all those who are affected by it and deal
with it: avoiding doctrinal inconsistency and ambiguity; offering clarity to
commercial actors; reducing waste associated with the oversupply of
intellectual property rights; and, most of all, generating meaningful
social progress of the sort that both the Constitution and our English
ancestors anticipated from granting exclusive rights to products of the
mind.
It is plausible, perhaps even inevitable, that the legal system should
want to know what the “thing” is that it is dealing with, whether in a
property-bound world, a world of commercial regulation of knowledge,
both, or some other. It is inevitable that the legal system describes and
builds these things as much as it finds them, and perhaps more so. But
there is nothing essential or necessary about dividing the world into
180
Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 817 (2010).
181
See id. at 833–35.
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“patentable things” rather than “copyrightable things” or “trademarked
things” any more than there is anything essential or necessary about
dividing a patentable “invention” from a particular embodiment or a
copyrightable work of authorship from its fixation in a tangible medium
182
of expression. These lines are conveniences that suit particular times
and places, and they should be discarded or at least limited, if time and
circumstance warrant. The neologism “intellectual property” captures an
important commonality—not the arguably property-like character of
each of these things, but the now-accepted notion that they share an
inescapably imaginative character. Inventions, works, and marks are
related products of the “labor of the head,” and with that phrase I mean
to capture not only the efforts and ingenuity of inventors and creators,
but also the reactions and re-combinations that inhabit the minds of
audiences and downstream generations. Even the most abstract physical
laws are products of particular times, places, communities, and impacts.
That fact does not deprive them of their status as physical laws. It merely
reinforces the proposition that all knowledge is social.
To decide what the law has to do with knowledge is to accept the
relevance of some social contexts and to reject others. What is “the
invention,” either during prosecution of a patent application or during a
patent infringement lawsuit? Every patent lawyer knows that claims can
and will be drafted, where possible, to capture potential infringers; every
trial lawyer will argue for a construction of the claims of the patent that
embraces what the defendant has done. The real question in either case
is not whether the words used in the patent and the things described by
the patent are congruent, even if that is what the doctrine requires; the
real question is whether an accused infringer has unfairly appropriated a
form of knowledge that is fairly associated with the patentee and with the
patentee’s customers.
What would the world of intellectual property look like, then, if it
were more accepting of multiple, intersecting contexts for patent,
copyright, and trademark (and perhaps other doctrines) as elements of a
single knowledge law framework, with less emphasis on subject matter
qualifiers? The question is mostly rhetorical; I am aware of the enormous
practical impediments to pursuing this question at any level below the
most conceptual. But even the conceptual conversation may have value. I
conclude with the following tentative considerations.
Knowledge law would be less consumed with the specific form of the
thing that the law needs to address than patent, copyright, and
trademark law are today. Claim construction in patent law, the doctrine
of fixation in copyright law, and the distinction between product design
182
Cf. Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 873 (2009) (advocating a shift away from focus on subject matter of each
intellectual property doctrine in favor of a boundary managing approach grounded
in intellectual property regimes as complementary or substitute appropriability
mechanisms).
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and product packaging (and the functionality doctrine) in trademark law
are all features of current law that could be re-examined and perhaps
rendered more flexible. All of these doctrines share an interest in the
relationship between fixed or tangible form and creative, inventive, or
distinctive content.
Liability standards would be reformed to provide greater conceptual
coherence within each sub-domain of knowledge law and greater
alignment (though not identity) of standards between sub-domains.
Patent law currently permits claims for literal infringement and
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, with different
conceptual frameworks for structural claims, method or process claims,
183
Claim
and means-plus-function claims, among other things.
construction is a question for the court; infringement is a question for
184
the jury. Copyright law and trademark law each have their respective
tar pits of liability rules, organized around the concept of “substantial
185
similarity” in copyright and “likelihood of confusion” in trademark. All
of these doctrines share an interest in the role that identity plays when
considering the just uses of knowledge.
Remedies for misuse of knowledge—damages and injunctions for
infringement—would be reconsidered. In many respects, in light of the
Supreme Court’s opinion in eBay, revising standards for injunctive relief
186
in patent cases, some of this reconsideration is underway. Much more
could be done to rethink the availability of statutory damages in
copyright but not other intellectual property disciplines, and the
availability of criminal penalties in copyright and trademark cases but not
in patent cases. Knowledge law is not a one-size-fits-all concept, but
remedial similarities and differences among sub-domains could be made
part of a single overall framework.
Finally, a body of knowledge law would revive and be informed by
interest in developing and describing the purposes of the law in more
detail, beyond vague admonitions that it should be “utilitarian” in
character. Even my references above to the idea of knowledge as a social
construct and product are too broad. What I have in mind, however, is
the restoration in law of an ethics of knowledge. The separation of
knowledge arguments from intellectual property arguments that I
describe here, and the resulting elaborate doctrinal introspection,
correspond largely to the rise of intellectual property interests as tradable
abstractions. Modern theory treats creations and inventions as public
goods, subject to flawed private markets. That theory treats copyright and
patent law as solutions to those flaws, offering incentives to authors and
inventors that they otherwise would lack. The English pre-history of
183

See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
185
See Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 629–30 (6th Cir.
2002); Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996).
186
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
184
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modern copyright and patent suggests that markets were a consequence
of notions of rights in knowledge, rather than their cause. Knowledge as
a source of virtue was the common starting point. Aristotelian philosophy
suffers from many flaws, but recovering and exploring a kind of
Aristotelian belief in the association of virtue and knowledge, and
applying some of that belief to modern intellectual property law, may
offer some Copernican clarity to a body of law that now suffers from
Ptolemaic complexity.

